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Abstract:
The article focusses on policy ideas as explanatory variables for understanding policymaking and governance 
in Russia. Following Schmidt’s definition of the ideational process as a ‘discourse’ in which actors promote 
their preferred policy ideas in competition with their opponents, the article argues that in Russia the char-
acter of discourses varies between three state levels: the President, ministerial bureaucracy and the regional 
& local levels. This variegated landscape of policy discourses involves the intensive communicative discourse 
of the Russian President, which seeks legitimation of main policy approaches with the public and provides 
signals for the lower level officials. The middle level of policy bureaucracy is characterised by a vigorous coor-
dinative discourse in which officials and non-state experts defend their ideas and seek agreement on policy 
details. Finally, at the local level political communication and technical coordination of policy ideas coex-
ist and involve, apart from the officials and experts, members of the public. The benefit of the ideas-based 
perspective on policy and governance in Russia is that it allows not only tracing the origins and evolution of 
various policy initiatives, but also seeing the sources of presidential popularity and regime flexibility asso-
ciated with the accommodation of different ideational positions. The argument is illustrated with exam-
ples of policymaking in the social sphere, the Maternity Capital programme and the Moscow programme 
of housing renovation.
The Power of Ideas
Ideas are treated as important independent variables 
in the public policy, comparative politics, and political 
economy literatures (Beland and Cox 2010). Yet, they 
are drawn upon less frequently for the analysis of Rus-
sian politics. The reason for this may be that ideas often 
erroneously appear as unconnected to actors’ interests. 
Because of this, ideas as explanatory variables can be 
treated as too soft to be factors in motivating actors’ 
behaviour in the context of Russia. Take the current 
example of President Putin seeking to amend the Con-
stitution to allow him to continue in office. Ideas may 
appear hardly influential in the context of authoritar-
ian leaders wishing to preserve their power. Nonethe-
less, comparative scholars working with ideas argue that 
actors’ motivations are complex and multidimensional 
and involve material and non-material components (Ber-
man 2013). In this perspective, ideas are not objective 
facts but are historical, social and political constructs. 
Therefore, actors’ motivations comprise the calculation 
of their utility within a given institutional setting, and 
their policy-specific beliefs. The former can be referred 
to as institutionally determined ideas, and the latter as 
policy ideas.
We can bring these insights to bear on the problem 
of policy and governance in Russia. In a non-democratic 
system, success in policy is important as the basis for 
political legitimacy. In Russia as elsewhere, the policy 
process and governance involve a wide range of actors 
working at different levels of the state hierarchy. Besides 
the political leadership, these include state officials and 
non-state experts from research institutes and academia, 
whose contribution to policymaking has been encour-
aged in Russia since the Soviet period. In addition, fol-
lowing a more recent trend in public administration, 
also promoted is the participation of other civil society 
actors—citizens groups, councils, committees and 
NGOs—to assist the development and implementa-
tion of policy at different state levels, from federal to local.
The motivations of these diverse state and societal 
actors involve ideas about how different policy issues 
should be addressed and problems tackled. They also 
include actors’ understandings about how to survive 
and thrive in a given institutional position. The Rus-
sian President’s motivations in the policy process, while 
involving a wish for the preservation of power, include 
specific policy beliefs, noted by existing research, such 
as fiscal conservatism, concern for demographic issues, 
and the belief in the strong state. State officials at lower 
levels may be after the preservation of their rents and 
privileges, while at the same time they also hold pref-
erences for specific policy solutions and approaches. As 
to civil society actors, in Russia as in other nondemoc-
racies, their contribution to policy and governance is 
controlled and limited, and the links to state structures 
are key for them to have any influence. Yet, these actors 
feel that they can make a difference, often for the most 
vulnerable social groups.
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How do actors promote their preferred institutional 
and policy ideas? Vivien Schmid (2008) defines the proc-
ess of conveying, adopting and adapting ideas by actors 
in interaction with their opponents as discourse. Actors 
explain policy, usually to the public, to generate sup-
port for their policies in a communicative discourse. They 
also defend their ideas and seek agreement on policies 
with other policy actors in a coordinative discourse. In 
the Russian context, where policy outputs are an impor-
tant source of the overall regime legitimacy, both inten-
sive policy communication and vigorous coordination 
coexist. These processes vary between three levels: the 
top level of the presidency, the middle level of the fed-
eral government and the regional & local level.
Below, I illustrate how policy ideas are commu-
nicated and coordinated by different actors in Russia, 
focussing on the three levels of government and using 
evidence from the social policy sphere. The benefit of this 
perspective is that by looking at the origins of policies 
and their evolution, it allows us to see the sources of the 
systems’ flexibility associated with the accommodation 
of different ideational positions, as well as the mech-
anism for preserving the president’s popularity.
The Top Level
At the top level, we find an active communicative dis-
course explaining policy to the public and giving cues to 
the officials at lower levels. To examine this discourse, we 
may usefully look at the annual addresses of the Russian 
president to the national parliament.1 During his first 
two terms in office, President Putin proclaimed social 
policy to be among key priorities for policy reforms. This 
was a popular policy focus as people at the time con-
nected their greatest anxieties to the failures of social 
provision, healthcare as well as the economy.2 Putin’s 
communication explained the necessity and usefulness 
of his preferred neoliberal reform approach in this area. 
This approach included introducing means-testing of 
social provision and individuals taking greater respon-
sibility for their own welfare, which would improve ser-
vice quality and reduce budget costs. The president con-
trasted these advantages with the wasteful, inequitable 
and poor-quality social provision under the Soviet model.
Concern for the demographic situation became 
an important part of the President’s discourse. The his-
torically decreasing birth rates in Russia were exacer-
1 http://www.kremlin.ru/, the search term poslanie, accessed March 2020.
2 See for instance: https://www.levada.ru/2019/10/29/sotsiologi-nazvali-glavnye-strahi-rossiyan/ accessed 20 November 2019.
3 For example, the World Value Survey Wave 6 (2010–2014) demonstrates that a notably larger proportion of the Russians had anti-gay atti-
tudes (66.2%), compared to 39.6% in Poland, 22.4% in Germany and 20.4% in the US. Available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
WVSOnline.jsp accessed March 2020. The survey for Russia was taken in 2011, i.e. prior to President Putin’s turn to the conservative values 
rhetoric
bated by the transition recession in the 1990s (see Deni-
senko 2013) and were defined as a threat to Russia’s 
development and state security in the 2005 presiden-
tial address. These priorities were translated into specific 
social policy instruments put forward by Putin in his 
communicative discourse: the introduction of the insur-
ance principle in healthcare and the reliance on personal 
saving and mortgage finance in housing.
During the financial crisis of 2008, which coincided 
with Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency (2008–2012), the 
role of the state in providing a safety net to the citizens 
was emphasised. Effective social policy, President Med-
vedev argued, was the basis for economic and technolog-
ical modernisation, his preferred policy ideas. Yet, the 
overall belief in the neoliberal approach to welfare reform 
never waned. During Putin’s third and fourth presiden-
tial terms, his pursuit of popularity led him to appeal to 
conservative values, prevalent among a significant part 
of society3 which conflated in his communicative dis-
course with his belief in the strong state. Thus, the new 
emphasis on traditional family values and a strong Rus-
sian state merged with the earlier neoliberal focus on per-
sonal responsibility for individual and family welfare. In 
this way, individual responsibility for one’s personal and 
the nation’s wellbeing became interlinked. Yet in paral-
lel, the loyalty to the neoliberal agenda in social policy 
could be seen in the encouragement of NGOs as social 
service providers and the use of consultations and par-
ticipation to solve local conflicts, such as those in the 
area of territorial development.
The Maternity Capital (MC) programme originally 
introduced in the presidential address in 2006 deserves 
attention because this policy blended the central ideas 
of Vladimir Putin’s presidency for social policy: neolib-
eralism, concern for demography and traditional values 
in a single initiative. This much-discussed policy was 
described as the largest expansion of the Russian wel-
fare state since the Soviet period (Cook 2011). Its roots in 
the traditional understanding of women’s role in family 
and society are also underscored in the literature (see 
Hornke 2020). The policy offered a large monetary bene-
fit to every mother who had a second child. The money 
could be invested in pension savings, housing purchases 
with the help of mortgage credit or a child’s education. 
Housing became the most common usage of this bene-
fit. Around 5 million of the 9 million maternity cap-
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ital certificates issued by 2018 were invested in housing. 
3.3 million were used to take out a mortgage loan.4 The 
inclusion of the pension savings and housing investment 
options demonstrates that the programme was designed 
to promote fertility in a very neoliberal way: specifi-
cally aiming to create the source of long-term funding 
badly lacking in the financial sector, popularise mort-
gage borrowing, saving behaviour and investment. The 
origins of many of such policy details within the policy 
bureaucracy are apparent, as also shown below. In this 
context, policy experts elaborated policy details rather 
than altered core policy ideas held by the President.
The Middle Level
The translation of top-level ideas into specific policy 
measures takes place at the middle level. This involves 
a process of policy coordination of institutionally deter-
mined and policy-related ideas held by ministerial offi-
cials and experts. The chief executive also participates 
in this process but less overtly. The policy coordina-
tion surrounding the evolution of the MC programme 
offers one example.
Two groups of expert and bureaucratic opinion 
regarding the MC policy were formed. The first group, 
which centred around the social bloc ministries, includ-
ing the ministries of Health, Labour and Social Protec-
tion, and Housing, considered the policy an important 
channel to support fertility and improve housing con-
ditions for millions of households. While it pointed 
to certain limitations of the program, particularly the 
increased chances of poverty among families who took 
out a mortgage, the research of this expert community 
highlighted that access to housing—an important part 
of social capabilities and family wealth—has improved 
(e.g. Grishina and Tsatsura 2018). Meanwhile, fertility 
rates increased from 1.1 children per woman in 2000 
to 1.7 per woman in 2015.5
Another expert community linked to the Ministry 
of Economy, although not denying the acute nature of 
the Russian demographic concerns, argued that MC was 
hardly responsible for the increase in births. These were 
instead attributed to economic growth and, more impor-
tantly, the fact that a larger cohort of women entered 
child-bearing age in the early-2000s while the slowdown 
in births in the late 2010s (to 1.5 per woman in 2018)6 
was linked to the cyclical reduction of women in the fer-
tile age bracket. Besides, it was noted that in many cases 
the policy encouraged families to shift the birth calendar 
forward rather than incentivise ‘additional’ children in 
4 Pension Fund of Russia (PFRF), V Mosckve proshlo rasshirennoe zasedanie pravleniya PFR, 11 December 2018, available at http://www.pfrf.
ru/press_center/~2018/12/11/172366, accessed 13 December 2019.
5 See Rosstat, https://www.gks.ru/folder/12781, Table: Summarniy koefitzient rozhdaemosti, accessed April 2020.
6 Ibid
7 Federal Law N 418-FZ, from 28 December 2017, https://rg.ru/2017/12/29/fz418-site-dok.html accessed April 2020.
families. Following this logic families decided to have 
their planned second child earlier than they would have, 
thanks to the programme. Instead of the costly, non-
means-tested MC, this community advocated the intro-
duction of smart benefits for families following Euro-
pean practises in this regard (e.g. Kuzminov et al 2015).
The competition between the two viewpoints affected 
the evolution of the MC scheme. For instance, policy 
coordination among the two groups was key in decid-
ing the priorities for the critical 2017 budget (Khmel-
nitskaya 2017). At the time, MC continued to be funded 
in the budget as advocated by the social bloc of the gov-
ernment, yet its indexation according to inflation was 
foregone to meet the position of the fiscally conserva-
tive part of the government and the associated experts.
Further, in 2018, an element of means-testing was 
introduced when small monthly amounts for everyday 
needs were allowed to be paid out from the large MC 
benefit to families falling below a certain income thresh-
old after the birth of their second child.7 This option 
echoed the argument of the first community about the 
increased chances of poverty among families with chil-
dren and the burden of mortgage repayments, while also 
taking on board the proposals of the second community 
about the need for means-testing.
The President’s role in this policy coordination 
process was felt indirectly. For instance, the President 
refrained from mentioning the MC in the 2017 address 
to the nation when the policy could have been discon-
tinued due to budget pressures. At the same time, Pres-
ident Putin reiterated his commitment to the demo-
graphic agenda in his inaugural presidential decree from 
May 2018. He also announced personally several further 
developments of the MC scheme, including the intro-
duction of additional lump-sum benefits to families who 
had their third or subsequent children for the repayment 
of their mortgage loans taken out earlier (address to par-
liament February 2019) and the extension of the MC pro-
gramme to first births in the January 2020 address. The 
latter announcements could again be seen as referencing 
advice from the first community about the higher risks of 
poverty among young families when they take out mort-
gage loans. The decisions also reflect the advice of the 
second community about the shift forward in birth cal-
endars, and the concern of all experts who observed the 
reduction in birth-rates and, particularly, in first births 
since 2016. These announcements were also a way for 
the President to make popular political statements, as 
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opinion polls demonstrate that an increasing number of 
Russians consider larger family size as more desirable.8
The Local Level
Finally, the local level displays a mix of communicative 
and coordinative discourses. Here we can identify the 
‘official’ communication by regional leaders and local 
officials that echoes the slogans and messages put for-
ward by the President. For instance, this relates to the 
promotion of public participation in local matters and 
the involvement of civil society organisations in local 
governance, particularly territorial development. Poli-
cymaking taking place at the local level, at the same 
time, involves a similar coordinative discourse featur-
ing institutionally determined and policy ideas, held by 
officials and experts, observed at the federal level. Yet, 
the coordinative discourse at this level can also involve 
a contribution from civil society groups and the mobil-
ised public. Local officials keen to underscore the par-
ticipatory nature of local governance in their territories 
reference instances of such consultations in their polit-
ical communication.
To illustrate this dynamic I draw on the example 
of the programme of housing renovation introduced in 
Moscow in 2017. Urban development in Moscow was 
the most contentious issue under the previous mayor 
Yuriy Luzhkov. Allegations of industry influence and cor-
ruption concerning the process of ‘chaotic urbanisation’ 
and ‘pinpoint construction’ in the city were widespread. 
Protests against these by Muscovites were frequent and 
bitter (e.g. Greene 2014). House prices in Moscow were 
least affordable compared with the rest of the country. 
Luzhkov was dismissed by President Medvedev in 2010 
and replaced with Sergei Sobyanin.
The new mayor’s communicative discourse followed 
that of the President’s about the greater openness of local 
governance to participation by local communities. He 
was assisted in this by new appointments in the Moscow 
city administration and advice from a new think tank for 
urban development and design, the Strelka Institute. Yet, 
the key issue for the city development—providing afford-
able housing for Muscovites and an opportunity for the 
construction industry to make profits—was solved based 
on the ideas of one part of the expert-bureaucratic com-
munity. This involved the proposal to extend the offi-
cial city boundaries to the South-West. The decision was 
implemented in 2011 by President Medvedev’s decree. 
Plans to develop new technological clusters in the ‘New 
Moscow’ aligned with Medvedev’s beliefs in modernisa-
tion. Muscovites, despite the ‘consultative turn’ in city 
8 Vnuki v defitzite, Ogoniok, N 43, 05 November 2019, available at https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4142388, accessed April 2020.
9 See for instance: https://www.mos.ru/city/projects/renovation/ accessed September 2019
governance, were not consulted on this issue and were 
less than keen on moving to vast new territories.
The redevelopment of land within the old city bor-
ders was a competing idea of another expert-bureaucratic 
community. Following quick disappointment with the 
‘New Moscow’ idea, the proposals about city densifica-
tion started being developed by the city planning depart-
ment in the mid-2010s. The plan for the renovation of 
Moscow districts containing old low-rise ‘khrushchevki’ 
buildings and rehousing of their residents was presented 
to the public in February 2017. The programme was 
presented to Muscovites as a response to public requests 
to help khrushchevki residents be rehoused into better 
accommodation during a meeting with municipal dep-
uties in early February. Yet, protests sprang up imme-
diately after the announcement. There was a lack of 
clarity in the programme’s criteria and in the terms of 
rehousing options offered. Importantly the belief that 
Muscovites ‘owned’ the city and their khrushchevki dis-
tricts (see Reid 2019) rather than the team of city offi-
cials were key points which in the end united the pub-
lic against the programme.
The city administration attempted to use bureau-
cratic-expert coordination to offer the public a more 
acceptable version of renovation in early spring 2017. 
Yet, that failed spectacularly as the protests only inten-
sified culminating in mid-May with the largest demon-
stration on 14 May. As a result city officials had to open 
the coordinative discourse to the beliefs and ideas of the 
Muscovites. This was done in the form of online voting 
for or against the inclusion of individual buildings in the 
programme, public hearings at the State Duma, and the 
formation of a working group at the Duma including 
representatives of the mobilised Muscovites and those 
Duma deputies with experience in dealing with housing 
issues. These actions allowed significant improvement 
and clarification in rehousing conditions for those who 
agreed to be rehoused by the programme.
The Law on Renovation was finally signed by Putin 
in July 2017 and implementation began in August of 
that year. Later the city administration in its political 
communication lauded the consultation with the pub-
lic, which as this account shows was forced upon the 
administration during spring 2017, as exemplar of its 
participatory urban development strategy.9
The coordination with the public could be interpreted 
as only a minor corrective to an otherwise bureaucratic-
expert dominated process, which was really about the 
competition between two ideas of urban expansion and 
urban densification. We nonetheless regard this coordi-
nation as important because it significantly changed the 
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terms of the renovation programme itself and reasserted 
the public’s ‘right to the city’ in the relations between 
Muscovites and the city administration. The polls sug-
gest that the public generally (74%) approved the city’s 
renovation plans.10
Conclusion
Ideas are important explanatory variables in political sci-
ence and there is little ground to ignore their influence 
in Russian politics and governance. Ideas, interpreted as 
a discourse differentiated between three state and admin-
istrative levels, help us not only to perceive the origins 
and changes of one or another policy programme or 
understand how the President’s popularity is constructed 
through popular but vague messages and shielded from 
the attribution of failures over specific policy details. 
The focus on ideas also reveals the flexibility of govern-
10 Moskvich o problemakh goroda, 30 May 2019, Levada Tsentr, available at https://www.levada.ru/2019/05/30/moskvichi-o-problemah-goroda/ 
accessed October 2019
ance in Russia with the cues to lower-level officials in 
the presidential communicative discourse guiding policy 
at the lower levels, yet, leaving space for interpretation 
and importantly for the contribution to policy from 
the ideas and beliefs of other state and non-state actors, 
including experts, NGOs and public groups. This dem-
onstrates how policy outputs, associated with political 
legitimacy, are achieved, and how different actors are 
bound to the political system through the accommoda-
tion of their ideas in policymaking.
The current response to Covid-19 as expressed 
by President Putin in his address on 2 April 2020—
although criticised for not spelling out a clearer national 
strategy for dealing with the virus outbreak—follows 
the model offered above. It allows for flexible local gov-
ernance of the crisis including the input from diverse 
actors and competing ideas.
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Abstract
In Russia’s regions, companies closely collaborate with state administrations in the field of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). Different forms of interaction have emerged, including the so-called “socio-economic 
cooperation agreements” (SECAs). These agreements between business actors and governors define mutual 
responsibilities with regard to regional development and regulate the companies’ social and ecological invest-
ments in their territories of presence. In addition, business and state actors collaborate in joint investment 
projects, public-private partnerships, working groups and charity activities. Business-state collaboration is 
characterized by interdependence: companies need licenses and administrative support for business opera-
tions, while state actors seek additional financing for welfare provision and regional infrastructure. For com-
panies, CSR has become an important tool to institutionalize their charity activities and determine their 
social obligations towards the state.
CSR in Russia
The debates about corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
have reached Russia, as Russian companies are increas-
ingly operating on international markets and have 
become part of global value chains. A growing number of 
large corporations in Russia participate in CSR networks 
such as the United Nations Global Compact Initiative 
and the Global Reporting Initiative. At the national level, 
the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs 
(RSPP) plays an important role in supporting its member 
companies to introduce CSR programs and reporting.
The adoption of CSR practices in Russia is shaped by 
the institutional context. Particularly in regions where 
industrial plants are located, Russian companies rely on 
Soviet and pre-Soviet traditions of responsibility and 
corporate charity. In addition to these path-depend-
ent developments, one can observe increasing pressures 
from international customers who oblige export-orien-
ted Russian companies to comply with human rights and 
ecological standards. Russian-style CSR has thus devel-
oped in the interplay of national and international fac-
tors. This raises the question of how global CSR practices 
are adopted and implemented in Russia’s regions and 
what importance they have for business-state relations.
The Russian state needs close cooperation with the 
economy to meet welfare needs and to adhere to environ-
mental standards. Business actors, in turn, are depend-
ent on state support as they need infrastructure and 
licenses for production. This interdependence is appar-
ent at all levels of the state hierarchy, but especially at 
the regional level where state administrations are heavily 
dependent on the few large corporations that are present 
in the region. Both sides put efforts into systematizing 
and formalizing the traditionally highly informal rela-
tionship between state and business. We therefore inves-
tigate how state and business actors work together in the 
field of CSR in Russia’s regions.
In this contribution, we first look into the different 
forms of business-state cooperation and the decision-
making mechanisms which have emerged in this sphere. 
We then discuss the contribution of companies to the 
social and ecological development and the role of civil 
society in Russia’s regions, before we conclude with sum-
marizing the main motivations of Russian companies 
for their commitment in the field of CSR.
Interdependence Between State and 
Business
Relations between state and business actors in Russia 
can be described as highly interdependent (Yakovlev 
2006). Although the state plays a leading role within 
the increasingly authoritarian regime, the relationship 
between the actors is not one-sided. Given the scarcity 
of resources, especially at the regional level, state actors 
heavily rely on the financial support and the socio-polit-
ical capacities of companies. In this way, an exchange of 
resources takes place in which both sides are interested 
(Kononenko and Moshes 2011).
Russian companies act as socially responsible actors 
in cooperation with the state and have established them-
selves as solid partners of regional and municipal author-
ities. By doing this, they safeguard their own economic 
interests vis-à-vis the state, secure necessary licenses 
for production and avoid possible sanctions, which can 
become crucial for their economic survival in a political 
regime which is characterized by a limited rule of law and 
restricted property rights (Markus 2015). Moreover, the 
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cooperation with regional administrations gives com-
panies an opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes regarding the socio-economic development in 
the regions where their production sites are located. The 
coordination of social and ecological activities with the 
authorities is an important part of the companies’ gov-
ernment relations (GR activities). It enables companies 
to access administrative and other state resources and has 
recently become increasingly systematized and institu-
tionalized (Fifka and Pobizhan 2014).
Forms of Business-State Cooperation
Since there has been no legislation in the area of  CSR 
in Russia, the interaction between state and business 
actors mainly develops according to informal rules 
(Ledeneva 2013). Nevertheless, business-state collab-
oration has obtained a certain degree of institution-
alization. One can distinguish between four forms of 
cooperation: 1) socio-economic development agree-
ments between companies and regional or local admin-
istrations, the so-called SECAs; 2) joint social invest-
ments projects and public-private partnerships (PPP); 
3) working groups, committees and other consultative 
mechanisms with the participation of company repre-
sentatives and state actors; 4) informal collaboration, 
including personal interactions between company rep-
resentatives and regional decision-makers as well as cor-
porate charity projects and ad-hoc requests for financial 
support from the side of state institutions.
First, the SECAs are a relatively strongly institution-
alized form of cooperation between the state and busi-
ness (Kurbatova and Trofimova 2015). The agreements 
are usually concluded for a period of three to five years 
and are accompanied by additional annual contracts 
which list specific projects and fixed expenditures of 
the companies for road and bridge construction, main-
tenance and development of social infrastructure as well 
as long-term sponsorships of sport, culture and educa-
tion in the region. In the agreements, both sides com-
mit to mutual support. Companies are assured of remov-
ing administrative barriers and receiving state subsidies, 
tax reductions and bureaucracy relief for investment 
projects. In return, regional and local administrations 
receive large amounts of financial aid from companies 
to fulfil their social-political tasks.
The second form of cooperation are joint projects 
between large companies and the state. These projects 
are either realized within the framework of SECAs or on 
a separate contractual basis. The latter applies to com-
panies that do not conclude long-term social economic 
development agreements with the authorities. The sub-
ject areas of joint projects essentially correspond to the 
projects listed in the SECAs. The substantial difference 
is that state support in this context is limited to the spe-
cific objective of a single project. Potential state support 
for the general economic activity of a company in the 
region only takes place on an informal basis.
Third, participation in committees and working 
groups is another, more informal form of cooperation 
between state and business. On the one hand, company 
representatives take part in the councils and commit-
tees of regional ministries or public chambers where 
they can make proposals for government expenditures 
in the respective subject areas. On the other hand, state 
actors are involved as experts in the selection procedures 
of the grant competition programs for social organiza-
tions and municipal institutions, organized by large 
corporations. Compared to the above mentioned agree-
ments and joint projects, this type of cooperation is far 
less binding for both sides and mainly serves the pur-
pose of information exchange.
Fourth, another weakly institutionalized form of 
cooperation are ad-hoc requests from regional and 
municipal administrations. Companies are sometimes 
asked by the authorities to directly participate in the 
financing of repair and construction works in social 
institutions, to provide funding for the organization of 
public events or to support social organizations or indi-
viduals, for example in case of medical emergencies. By 
providing assistance, companies demonstrate loyalty 
to the authorities and maintain channels of informal 
communication with state officials, which can in turn 
be used for settling conflicts and safeguarding their 
business interests. However, this highly informal ad-
hoc interaction also paves the way for excessive state 
demands and creates additional costs that affect the 
companies’ long-term financial planning in the regions.
Companies’ Contribution to Regional 
Development
In addition to cooperation with state authorities in social 
matters, Russian companies have developed their own 
CSR programs which are largely independent of the state. 
Some companies have also established corporate founda-
tions which are responsible for implementing social pro-
grams and grant competitions (Krasnopolskaya 2020). 
The companies’ priorities lie in the regions or cities where 
their production sites are located, the so-called “terri-
tories of presence.” Sometimes, cities and small industrial 
towns fully depend on one large company and are there-
fore called “monocities” (Crowley 2016). The geographi-
cal focus of many CSR programs is also reflected in their 
name. The oil company GazpromNeft, for example, calls 
its CSR program “Hometowns”, while the metallurgic 
company Rusal speaks about the “Territories of Rusal”. 
Other companies focus on the philanthropic character 
of their CSR activities, such as the chemical company 
Sibur with the “Formula of Good Deeds” program.
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In recent years, many Russian corporations have 
started to institutionalize their CSR programs in order 
to achieve greater uniformity across different production 
sites and territories of presence. One can observe a gen-
eral trend from corporate charity to systematic CSR pro-
grams. Already existing activities are often integrated in 
one nation-wide umbrella program. Russian companies 
increasingly orientate themselves towards international 
CSR standards and embrace global developments such 
as the United Nations Sustainability Agenda or the con-
cept of social investments. Important CSR promoters in 
Russia are the business association RSPP, which has been 
supporting the introduction of CSR reporting among its 
member companies since 2012, and the Russian Associa-
tion of Managers, which offers training for professionals 
and organizes community building events. International 
trends are becoming increasingly important in Russia, 
as companies operating on international markets are 
obliged by their customers or investors to comply with 
global CSR standards. At the regional level, mixed forms 
of CSR have emerged, whereby new CSR programs are 
often linked to Soviet and pre-Soviet traditions of cor-
porate charity and responsibility (Crotty, 2016). The 
introduction of corporate volunteering programs, for 
example, has led to a revival of the Soviet tradition of 
“subbotniks” during which employees are asked to engage 
in voluntary work on their free Saturdays.
One of the reasons for companies to systematize their 
CSR programs and formalize their cooperation with the 
state is to protect themselves from increased demands 
and state encroachments. A legacy of the Soviet planned 
economy is that both state actors and local populations 
have high expectations of social responsibility, especially 
with regard to regionally based companies. These expec-
tations result from the Soviet economic structure where 
local plants were fully responsible for providing welfare 
to their employees and the local populations. Until today, 
the so-called “town-forming enterprises” (“gradoobra-
zuiushchie predpriiatiia”) are expected to support social 
institutions in their territories, such as clinics, schools 
and kindergartens (Popova 2018). The formalization 
and (most importantly) the fixation of mutual obliga-
tions in the SECAs define the limits of the companies’ 
social investments and their financial and infrastruc-
tural participation in the social development of their 
territories of presence. In this way, Russian companies 
have strengthened their position in the relationship with 
the state. They have limited the scope of ad hoc requests 
from the authorities and developed their cooperation 
with regional administrations from a traditional role 
as social welfare provider, known from Soviet times, 
to developing social investments, associated with long-
term planning and fixed role assignment for both sides.
What Role for Civil Society?
Scholars assume that companies have developed CSR 
in response to the pressures of civil society (Gjolberg, 
2009). In present-day Russia, however, the role of organ-
ized civil society is very restricted. Most organizations 
are too weak to take on the much more influential com-
panies. Moreover, there is largely no critical public in 
Russia which is able to hold business actors accountable 
for potential social or ecological damage and grievances. 
In recent years, however, important changes have been 
emerging in Russia. Environmental protests have been 
increasing in Russia’s regions, e.g. against air pollution or 
waste disposal sites (Arnold 2019). A number of Russian 
nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have successfully taken 
action against companies and achieved compliance with 
stricter environmental regulations at the local level. In 
addition, the demands on companies in their role as 
employers and producers are growing, as local employ-
ees, clients and residents in Russia’s regions demand 
good working and living conditions. Companies thus 
cannot anymore neglect the concerns of the local pop-
ulation, especially in remote regions where it is difficult 
for them to attract highly skilled professionals for indus-
trial production. Overall, however, Russian NPOs so far 
have remained weak. In the regions and especially in 
the so-called monocities, the local population is heavily 
dependent on the town-forming enterprises and there-
fore has little opportunity for critical control.
Conclusions: Why Do Companies Engage 
in CSR?
CSR is a relatively new phenomenon in Russia’s author-
itarian capitalism, largely shaped by the growing integra-
tion of Russian companies into global markets and the 
associated pressures from international costumers. How-
ever, in the form of social responsibility for employees and 
local population, Russian-style CSR is strongly connected 
to the Soviet understanding of industrial plants as local 
welfare providers. In this path-dependent role, today’s 
companies in Russia assume responsibility for securing 
welfare at the local level, e.g. by supporting social institu-
tions, closely collaborating with regional authorities and 
engaging in corporate charity. In developing CSR, the 
Russian state remains the central focal point for Rus-
sian companies as they need to prove their loyalty to the 
authorities and simultaneously protect their economic 
autonomy. In this complex relationship with the Russian 
state, CSR has become an important tool for companies, 
as it enables them to institutionalize their activities and 
thereby define their social obligations towards the state.
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